2.3 Development of naval reactors
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Parallel to the development and launching of four generations of nuclear submarines has been the development of four generations of naval nuclear reactors. Furthermore, prototype reactors have been developed for use in the submarines of Project 645 ZhTS class (K-27) and Project 661 - Papa class along with the submarines of Project 10831, Project 1851 - X-ray class and Project 1910 - Uniform class. A liquid metal cooled reactor has been put into serial production. There are minor differences in the construction of the reactors within each reactor generation as well as within each class of submarines. For example, both the OK-350 reactor found in submarines of the Project 670 - Charlie class and the reactor type OK-300 installed in Project 671 - Victor class submarines, are considered second generation submarine reactors.
A principal difference between submarine reactors and the reactors found in conventional nuclear power plants is in the size and power in proportion to volume.
The uranium fuel used in civilian nuclear power plants mainly has an enrichment of four percent 235U.[126] The enrichment is considerably higher in submarines. In Russian vessels, enrichment can be as much as 90 percent[127] so that submarines can go for longer periods between refuelling the reactors.
The thermal power of Russian submarine reactors varies from 10 MWt for the smaller reactors used in the Project 1910 - Uniform class submarines, to 200 MWt for the reactors used in the new Project 885 - Severodvinsk class submarine. The nuclear powered surface vessels, Project 1144 - Kirov class, have reactors with a thermal power of 300 MWt.
In the descriptions of naval reactors, the technical defects of the various reactors are emphasised, especially those that have led to accidents and an ensuing leak of radioactivity. It is important to keep this section in context with Chapter 8 to gain a complete picture of accidents involving Russian submarines.
2.3.1 First generation reactors
Several design and construction bureau's, manufacturers and corporations in the former Soviet Union have been involved with the construction of nuclear powered vessels. In 1952, the construction of the first nuclear powered submarine began, and it became necessary to solve a whole new series of engineering problems. For example, one of the main tasks was to construct the submarines' nuclear reactor, along with the various systems and mechanisms that would ensure its running without problems. Scientific director for some of the earliest work was academy member A. P. Aleksandrov, while principal builder of the nuclear reactor was academy member N. A. Dollezyal.[128]
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The decision was made to develop a pressurised water reactor to power the first nuclear submarine. This reactor was the first of its kind in the Soviet Union, for the construction of pressurised water reactors for use in land based nuclear power stations did not begin until 1955. During the development of naval pressurised water reactors, a whole new range of important problems arose, in which experience from the existing graphite moderated reactors offered no answers. (Graphite moderated reactors were built in the Soviet Union in order to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons).
Thus the first set of problems to be solved was as follows:[129]
1) Optimal cooling of the nuclear reactor;2) Methods of regulating the neutrons;
3) Methods for describing neutron behaviour in a pressurised water reactor;
4) High burnup of nuclear fuel and accumulation of fission products from 235U.
5) Development of heat transfer models for the nuclear reactor.
6) Development of automatic control procedures for nuclear reactors.
In order to solve these problems, a small nuclear reactor that could be used in a submarine was built. Later, four generations of such reactors with a series of modifications were constructed on the basis of this reactor.[130]
The construction of nuclear reactors for use in submarines was at that time a major technological achievement. However, from a radiation safety point of view, the reactors suffered from a number of serious flaws. These flaws resulted in a number of accidents, of varying degrees of severity. During the active life of the first generation submarines, there were five accidents in which the reactor was irreparably damaged. These were as follows (listed by the name of the submarine and the year of the accident): K-19 in 1961, K-11 in 1965, K-222 in 1980, K-431 in 1985 and K-192 (formerly K-131) in 1989. In addition, a first generation liquid metal cooled reactor on board the submarine K-27 broke down in 1968. Besides this, there have been two near critical accidents involving K-19 in 1961 and K-116 in 1979 There have also been 18 accidents involving first generation reactors that have resulted in releases of radioactivity. The first generation reactors were produced from 1957 to 1968.[131]
Flaws in first generation reactors:[132]
1) Large volume and distribution of space in the primary circuit. Pipes connecting the reactor with steam generators, pumps, heat exchangers, volume compensatory devices etc., were too large in diameter. This caused major problems in protection against leakage in the primary circuit (see breakdown of the K-129 submarine ), and easily caused wear of small pipes connecting monitoring instruments to the primary circuits. These were often ruined and became the cause of leaks (see accident involving the K-19 submarine).2) Poor reliability of heavy equipment, and in particular, the electric devices located in and around the nuclear reactor. Much of this equipment was not designed to endure large variations in temperature levels and pressure. The temperature in the primary circuits was approximately 300 oC, the steam had a temperature of 250 oC and the pressure level was approximately 200 atmospheres.
3) Operational problems in the automation of the reactor control processes.
4) Poor reliability of data from monitoring instruments was a problem for the operating personnel. The reliability of reactor control and protection systems was also poor (see breakdown of the K-222 submarine).
5) The third safety barrier was underestimated. Calculations later proved that the third safety barrier would lose its airtight qualities in the event of a breach in the primary circuit. This would result in the radioactive contamination of the reactor compartment. (see breakdown of the K-192 submarine).[133]
6) Insufficient system for the control of chain reactions in the reactor core - safety of the system questionable. Starting equipment can control nuclear processes in the reactor during start up only at minimum power. Before, the nuclear reactor was started up according to a special program calculated by the operating personnel. In some instances this program could be wrong.[134]
7) A lack of space around the lid of the reactor increased the danger of the lid being opened without the operators maintaining full control of the process. This, together with overloading of equipment and possible failure to follow procedures by the operating personnel, could lead to over pressure in the reactor core followed by an explosion (see accidents with K-431 and K-222 in 1980).[135] The cooling circuits in first and second generation nuclear submarines are such that reactor accidents resulting in explosions due to over pressure cannot occur because under all operating conditions, there will always be a certain amount of coolant in the reactor core.
There are a number of other flaws in the first generation reactors, especially in equipment that could lead to minor releases within the reactor compartment. Releases to the surrounding environment are eliminated by the submarine hull.
Today, all of the first generation submarines have been taken out of service and are awaiting decommissioning. (see table).[136] The ecological problems associated with these vessels are related to defuelling, deactivation of reactor equipment and the storing of radioactive equipment taken from the vessels.[137] Extra precautions must be taken when defuelling submarines containing damaged nuclear fuel. This is especially true of the submarine K-192 which in 1989 suffered a meltdown in one of its reactors. (See Chapter 6 on the decommissioning of nuclear submarines).
Another important point is that the first generation reactors were operated by self-taught crews who did not have the same sense of radiation safety as has become common in the operation of nuclear reactors today (see account of the accident involving the submarine K-19).[138] The lack of concern for radiation safety at that time was owing largely to the lack of experience in operating nuclear reactors in submarines.
During the last years of operation of the first generation of nuclear submarines, the vessels were staffed by officers and quartermasters who for various reasons could not work on the newer vessels.[139] This is also true of the vessels that have been taken out of service but not yet defuelled, and it affects the safety of laid up vessels waiting to be decommissioned.
2.3.2 Second generation reactors
As stated earlier, the second generation submarines (Project 667 Yankee and Delta class, Project 670 - Charlie class and 671 - Victor class) were developed and built from 1967 onwards. The first submarine with a second generation naval reactor came to the Northern Fleet in the second half of 1967.[140] Construction of the Project 667, the largest series of Soviet submarines, came to a stop in 1990.
The second generation reactors were developed based on the experiences gained from operating the former generation of reactors. Design flaws in the first generation reactors were taken into consideration and remedied. However, the consciousness of radiation safety was still in its infancy in the Soviet Union. The world had not yet seen the accidents of Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986).
Nor had any one anticipated reactor accidents entailing a loss of coolant. Leaks in the heat transfer pipes within the reactor were thought to be the worst conceivable problem that could arise. Therefore, only a limited number of safety standards were instituted to prevent loss of coolant in the reactor and thereby secure the safety of the submarine. [141]
Experience from the first generation reactors showed that the main operational problem was leakage of water from the primary to the secondary circuit. This occurred mainly through the steam generators. There were also problems of leaks in the pumping systems and the gaskets of the steam generators. The pumps and steam generators were intended to cool the reactor in the event of a power failure.
These experiences formed the basis for modifications introduced in the second generation reactors. Nevertheless, the loop pattern (i.e., a system of spiralling cooling pipes) was retained. The volume and distribution of the primary circuit was sharply reduced, and a system of pipes within pipes was used for the steam generators, especially for the newest pumps leading to the primary circuit.
The number of wide diameter pipes used in connecting some of the central components of the reactor (filter of the primary circuit, volume compensators and so forth) was also reduced. Practically all of the pipes (both large and small) were placed with biological shielding in the uninhabited parts of the submarine. The monitoring systems and the automatic control systems were also modified substantially. Remote control equipment became more common. In the second generation submarines, alternating current replaced the direct current used in the submarines of the first generation, and this change made it possible to reduce the size of some of the equipment. Finally, the turbine-generator was automated.[142]
Despite the changes, there were still safety problems in the operation of the second generation nuclear reactors. From 1967 to the present, there have been three major accidents involving these pressurised water reactors, on the submarines K-140 in 1968, K-320 in 1970 and K-314 in 1983. There also have been several minor incidents of leakage in the second generation reactors.[143] A very basic flaw in the second generation reactors was the poor quality of equipment used in the reactor core, steam generators and automatic equipment.
Reactor accidents are principally caused by cracks in the fuel assemblies with the ensuing leakage of water from the primary circuit to other cooling circuits via the steam generators. The poor quality of the equipment has caused accidents because of uncontrolled starting up of the reactor, as was the case in an accident involving the submarine K-146. There have also been problems of the automatic systems failing to function properly.
Other unsolved problems include:[144]
1) Cooling of the nuclear reactor at complete power failure in the submarine;2) Control of nuclear processes in the reactor during near-critical conditions (except some submarines in which an auxiliary start up system has been installed during repairs).
3) Loss of coolant in the reactor core in the event of a break in the primary circuit.
Towards the end of the 1970s came a growing awareness of safety. In that spirit, regulations for radiation safety were set that went beyond the government's own interests. General rules concerning safety (FBS, OPB (FBS-73) and OPB (FBS-82)) were established as well as safety rules and guidelines for nuclear reactors in which recommendations from MAGATE were taken into account. (These are abbreviations for Russian safety control authorities and safety regulations which are not easily translated into English).
2.3.3 Third generation reactors
Development on the third generation nuclear reactors began in the early 1970s, and it is these reactors that power submarines in the Project 941 - Typhoon class, 949 - Oscar class, 945 Sierra class and 971 Akula class. Henceforth reactors would be constructed with the intent of minimising the likelihood of accidents and breakdowns. New safety systems were developed, especially to ensure the cooling of the reactor core in emergency situations. New instruments and monitoring equipment were developed that would rapidly pinpoint problems inside the reactor. These systems were developed in order to handle many different types of leaks in the pipe systems at any time. This was especially important with respect to potential leakage in cooling pipes that were large in diameter.[145]
A new block system was developed to protect the cooling circuits from leakage. By replacing the old system of pipes with a block system, in which the reactor and the cooling system were treated as one block, the dimensions of the pipes and other components could be reduced because the cooling efficiency of the system could be increased.
From a safety point of view, this solved number of problems. First of all, this system permitted a natural circulation of coolant within the primary circuit, even at high power. This was important for the flow of coolant into the reactor core at complete or partial power failure. With the block system, pipes to the primary circuit were replaced with short, wide diameter pipes which connected the main components (reactor, steam generators, and pumps).[146] The reactors were equipped with a cooling system which operated independently of the batteries and that started up automatically in the event of a power failure.
The control and shielding system of the reactor was altered extensively. Emergency start equipment gave the possibility of controlling the state of the reactor at any level of power, even in near-critical situations. An automatic mechanism was installed on some of the control rods which in the event of power failure, would lower the reactor lid to its lowest level, thus completely halting the reactors. This would also occur should the submarine capsize. A number of other technical improvements contributing to increased safety were also introduced.[147]
The main safety problems of the third generation reactors were problems with the main components, especially the reactor core, and keeping them properly cooled during operation. The numerous mechanical processes increased the likelihood of operational problems. The safety systems were designed in a way such that mechanical parts or cooling pipes would burst before the reactor was irreparably damaged. This made it easier to locate damages and implement repair before it was too late.[148]
2.3.4 Fourth generation reactors
At the present time, none of the fourth generation submarines have come into service, but plans call for the completion of several Project 885 - Severodvinsk class vessels. The first will probably be ready in 1998.[149] The reactor for the first submarine was finished in 1995. Fourth generation nuclear reactors are formed into a single block. The monoblock design has the advantages of localising the coolant in the primary circuit into one volume of fluid and eliminates the need for pipes of wide diameter. The fourth generation reactors are constructed consistent with modern requirements for radiation safety. Due to the awkwardness of access to the reactor's mechanical parts, remotely controlled equipment is necessary, both during operation and partly during maintenance and repairs.[150]
2.3.5 Liquid metal cooled reactors
The liquid metal cooled reactor (AIFMV) is a special category of nuclear reactors. A series of submarines using liquid metal cooled reactors have been built (Project 705 - Alfa class). The first submarine to have a liquid metal cooled reactor was a Project 627 ZhTS class vessel, K - 27). The reactor of this submarine was severely damaged after a pipe in the reactor compartment was contaminated by corrosion particles from the liquid metal (a lead bismuth compound). Subsequently, one of the nuclear reactors overheated.[151]
On the initiative of Admiral G. Gorshkov (former chief admiral of the Navy), a series of seven submarines of Project 705 - Alfa class were constructed. The first Alfa class submarine, under the command of A.S. Pushkin, experienced a number of problems and small accidents during its sea trials and the short experimental period. It was finally dismantled after a series of large cracks occurred in the reactor compartment. The reactor along with its spent nuclear fuel was filled with furfurol and bitumen, and is now at the Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk. The remaining six submarines of this class were in operation for 10 years.[152] The submarines of the Alfa class as a whole had a total operational life of approximately 70 years.[153]
The advantages of the liquid metal cooled reactor lay in its dynamics which provided greater power from reactors that were more compact than the traditional pressurised water reactor. The main electrical system was designed to operate at a frequency of 400 hertz, which in turn permitted a reduction in size of some of the reactor equipment. On the other hand, the operation of the reactor became more complex. Nuclear reactors with lead-bismuth cooling systems were developed by Gidroprosess and by the OKBM design bureau in Nizhny Novgorod. [154]
The operation of liquid metal cooled reactors was complicated. The main problem was that the metal mixture solidified if the temperature fell below 125º C, and if this happened, the reactor could be damaged. At Zapadnaya Litsa, the base of the Project 705 - Alfa class submarines, a special land-based complex was built for the support of these submarines. A special boiler room to provide steam to the submarines was built in order to prevent the liquid metal from solidifying when the reactors were turned off. In addition to this, a destroyer and floating barracks supplied steam from their own boilers to the submarines at the piers. Due to the inherent dangers of using these external sources of heat, the submarine reactors were usually kept running, albeit at low power.
The high degree of automation was a further cause of operational problems with these submarines. Only two of the compartments were habitable. All systems and equipment were controlled from a control panel in the command centre. Since the submarines were designed to be as compact as possible, the crew on the Alfa class vessels was considerably smaller than that on other types of Russian submarines (30 as opposed to 100).[155]
Despite the occurrence of two accidents on submarines with liquid metal cooled reactors, these reactors are considered to be safer than the pressurised water reactors, for reasons related to qualities of the liquid metal coolant and the design of the reactor:[156]
1) High boiling point of the metal mixture (approximately 1680°C) with low pressure in the primary circuit, ruling out over pressure leading to an explosion in the reactor and the ensuing release of radioactivity.2) Rapid solidification of the liquid metal mixture in the event of leakage. The melting point of the mixture is 125°C, thereby excluding the possibility of reactor damage and loss of coolant.
3) Very little long-lived Alfa activity in the coolant.
4) No release of 210 Po gas (half-life 138 days).
5) Qualities of the reactor in the event of fractures in the fuel cladding or leaks in the primary circuit. Rules out significant releases of radioactive iodine, which constitutes the main danger to the crew.
6) Small contents of radioactivity, which rules out uncontrolled start up of the reactor with prompt neutrons, as well as the possibility for automatic shutdown of the reactor in the event of accidents.
7) The pressure immediately outside the primary circuit is higher than within this circuit, preventing the release of radioactive coolant.
The designers of the reactor have now solved the problems of "freezing" and "thawing" in the liquid metal mixture in the core, but submarines with liquid metal cooled reactors are no longer being built. The recently repaired K-123, based at Zapadnaya Litsa, is the only one left in service.[157]
2.3.6 Nuclear reactors on surface vessels
The nuclear reactors in use on Russian surface vessels were constructed drawing on experience gained from the building and operating of reactors for the nuclear icebreakers. The construction of the reactor is almost identical to that used in the nuclear icebreakers of the Arktika class. They have the classification KN-3 (OK-900) with a VM-16 type reactor core.
From the point of view of safety, the shortcomings in the construction of these reactors are the same as in the third generation submarine reactor,.[158] although there are greater problems entailed with the installation of nuclear reactors on surface vessels than on submarines. This is because no solution has been found to the problem of building land bases with the necessary support equipment for these vessels. As a result, the reactors on board the Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Nakhimov were shut down for long periods, because the land base simply could not supply enough electrical power, steam and other necessities to keep them running. The components in these reactors were soon worn out, and there were no funds to implement repairs. The vessels were finally taken out of service.[159]
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1: Reactor
2: (inner) protection tank
3: (outer) shield
4: emergency exit
5: control room
6: steam generator
7: reactor room
The problem of refuelling the reactors on these ships is not yet solved. It was assumed this operation would take place at the Sevmorput shipyard in Murmansk, but the shipyard lacks the proper facilities to undertake such an operation. Subsequently the decision was made to transfer the work to the shipbuilding yards in Severodvinsk. This has not yet happened either, for the water in Severodvinsk is so shallow that it is difficult for the big battleships to come alongside quay. It is not expected that more nuclear powered surface vessels will be built after the fourth battleship Pyotr Veliky leaves the St. Petersburg shipbuilding yard, and is delivered to the Northern Fleet.[160]
2.3.7 Russian submarine fuel
Fuel assemblies for Russian submarines with pressurised water reactors are produced at the machine building factory in Elektrostal outside Moscow. Fuel assemblies for the liquid metal cooled reactors on submarines of the Project 705-Alfa class and Project 645 ZhTS were produced at the Ulbinsky Metallurgical Works in Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan.[161]
The reactor core in Russian nuclear-powered submarines consists of between 248 and 252 fuel assemblies, depending on the type of the reactor. Most Russian nuclear-powered submarines have two reactors. Each fuel assembly contains tens of fuel rods, and these vary from the traditional round rods to more advanced flat rods.[162] The flat fuel rods are used particularly in the more recent generations of reactors. The point of the flat fuel rod is to enlarge the surface of each fuel rod so as to improve the thermal efficiency. Most of the uranium fuel assemblies are clad in steel or zirconium.[163]
| Project/class | Number of reactors | Type of reactors | Assumed degree of enrichment (%) | Power of reactors (TDermal power)MWt |
| 1st generation | ||||
| 627 A - November | 2 | PWR, VM-A | 21 | 70 |
| 658 - Hotel | 2 | PWR, VM-A | 21 | 70 |
| 659/675 - Echo-I-II | 2 | PWR, VM-A | 21 | 70 |
| 2nd generation | ||||
| 667 A - Yankee | 2 | PWR, OK-700, VM-4 | 21 | 90 |
| 667 B-BDRM - Delta I-IV | 2 | PWR, OK-700, VM-4-2 | 21 | |
| 670 A - Charlie-I | 1 | PWR, OK-350, VM-4 | 21 | 90 |
| 670 M - Charlie-II | 1 | PWR, OK-350, VM-4 | 21 | 75 |
| 671 - Victor I-II | 1 | PWR, OK-300, VM-4 | 21 | 75 |
| 671 - Victor III | 2 | PWR, OK-300, VM-4 | 21 | 75 |
| 3rd generation | ||||
| 941 - Typhoon | 2 | PWR, OK-650, W | 21 - 45 | 190 |
| 949 - Oscar I-II | 2 | PWR, OK-650 b | 21 - 45 | 190 |
| 945 - Sierra | 1 | PWR, OK-650 | 21 - 45 | 190 |
| 971 - Akula | 1 | PWR, OK-650 b | 21 - 45 | 190 |
| Prototypes | ||||
| 685 - Mike | 1 | PWR, OK-650 b-3 | 21 - 45 | 190 |
| 661 - Papa | 2 | PWR, VM-5 m | Unknown | 177 |
| 1910 - Uniform | 1 | PWR | Unknown | 10 |
| Liquid metal cooled | ||||
| 645 ZhTS | 2 | LMR, VT-1 | 90 | 73 |
| 705 - Alfa | 1 | LMR, OK-550, MB-40 A | 90 | 155 |
| Surface vessels | ||||
| 1144 - Kirov | 2 | PWR, OK-900 KN-3 | Unknown | 300 |
| 1941 - Kapusta | 2 | PWR, OK-900 KN-3, VM-16 | 55 - 90 | 171 |
Table 5: Russian naval reactors; types, degree of enrichment and power.[97]
The enrichment of fuel in pressurised water reactors varies from 21% 235U in first generation reactors to 43-44 % 235U in third generation reactors. The enrichment of the fuel assemblies stolen from a storage facility in Andreeva Bay in 1993 was said to be 36%, and were suitable for insertion into third generation nuclear reactors. The fuel assemblies stolen from a storage facility in Rosta the same year were enriched to 28%,[165] and were suited for submarines of the Project 671 RTM-Victor-III class. The fuel of some pressurised-water reactors have even higher enrichment than this. The Project 1941 - Kapusta class nuclear powered communication ships of the Pacific Fleet have reactor cores with an enrichment of 55-90%. The enrichment of fuel in liquid metal cooled reactors can be as high as 90 percent U235.[166] Some submarines have probably utilised fuel of a different enrichment than is standard for the reactor on an experimental basis.
The reactor cores of third generation nuclear powered submarines contain fuel assemblies of varying degrees of enrichment. The fuel assemblies in the middle of the reactor core are enriched to 21% 235U, while the outermost fuel assemblies are enriched as much as 45% 235U. The reactors of third generation nuclear submarines contain approximately 115 kilograms of 235U. The reactors on second generation submarines contain a total of approximately 350 kilograms of uranium, of which 70 kilograms are 235U.[167] A standard reactor core of a first generation nuclear submarine has a total of approximately 250 kilograms of uranium, of which 50 kilograms are 235U. These are also the quantities stated for each reactor dumped in the Kara Sea while still containing its nuclear fuel.[168]
Footnotes[126] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties, Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Chapter 5 - The Kola Nuclear Power Plant Return
[127] Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Waste in the Arctic, an Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination, September 1995. Return
[128] Morskoy sbornik, No. 1 - 1995. Return
[129] The items below are listed in Atomnaya Energiya, Vol. 73, No.4 - 1992. Return
[130] Ibid. Return
[131] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties. Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return
[132] Unless otherwise stated, this information is from Bakhmetyev, A. M., Methods of judging safety levels and securing nuclear energy generators, 1992 Return
[133] Sudostroenie, No. 11-12, 1992. Return
[134] Alyeshin, V. S., Vessel Nuclear Reactors. Return
[135] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 4 - 1993. Return
[136] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995 Return
[137] Krasnaya Zvezda, July 13, 1995. Return
[138] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 2 - 1994. Return
[139] Morskoy sbornik, No. 6 - 1993. Return
[140] Krasnaya Zvezda, April 29., 1995. Return
[141] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 2 and 4 - 1994. Return
[142] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 4 - 1993. Return
[143] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties. Bellona Report no.1 :1994 and Osipenko, L., Shiltsov, L., and Mormul, N., Atomnaya Podvodnaya Epopeya, 1994. Return
[144] Kremlin, A. E., Security at Nuclear Energy Installations and Sarkisov, A. A., Physical Basis for the Use of Nuclear Steam Producing Installations and Atomnaya Energiya, No. 4 - 1993. Return
[145] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 4 1996. Return
[146] Atomnaya Energiya, No.4 -1993 and No. 6 1994. Return
[147] Ibid. Return
[148] Ibid. Return
[149] Jane's Fighting Ships 1995 - 96, 98th edition. Return
[150] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1 - 1992 and No. 2- -1984 Return
[151] Vårt Vern, No 1 1993. Return
[152] Pavlov, A. S., Military Vessels of the Soviet Union and Russia 1945 - 1995, 3rd edtion, 1994.. Return
[153] Atomnaya Energiya, No. 1 - 1992 and No. 2 - 1992. Return
[154] Ibid. Return
[155] Burov, V. N., Otechestvennoye voyennoye Korablestroyeniye, St. Petersburg, 1995. Return
[156] Ibid. Return
[157] Pavlov, A.S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1945-1995, 1994. Return
[158] Sudostroenie (shipbuilding), No.9-1990 and No.1-1991. Return
[159] Handler, J., Greenpeace, Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific Fleet, Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems Submarine safety, and Security of Naval Fuel. p.44, October 27, 1994. Return
[160] Krasnaya Zvezda, October 13, 1995. Return
[161] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning, 1995. Return
[162] Ibid. Return
[163] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties. Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return
[164] Information collected from; Pavlov, A. S., Military Vessels in the Soviet Union and Russia 1946-1995, 1994.; Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Waste in the Arctic, an Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts of Soviet Nuclear Contamination, 1995; Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., 1995. Return
[165] Moscow News, No. 48, December 8-14, 1995. Return
[166] Bukharin, O., and Handler, J., Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Decommissioning, 1995. Return
[167] Nilsen. T., and Bøhmer, N., Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties. Bellona Report no.1 :1994. Return
[168] Yablokov, A. V., Facts and problems related to radioactive waste disposals in seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation, Moscow 1993. Return
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