1.4 The future of the Northern Fleet
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The future of the Northern Fleet will largely depend on the development of military and political events in Russia. Economic and regional developments in the Arctic region will also affect the fate of the Northern Fleet. Although the entire build-up of the Northern Fleet was a product of the arms race and the Cold War, it is improbable that the Northern Fleet would be reduced to 1950 levels, despite the fact that the Cold War has now ended. The new military doctrine of Russia emphasises that the Northern Fleet's primary mission is to defend Russian territory.[57]
Assuming that the terms of the START-II treaty are fulfilled, by the year 2003 over 50 percent of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads will be carried on nuclear submarines as opposed to just under 25 percent today.[58] According to the START-II Treaty, a maximum of 1 750 nuclear warheads may be placed on Russian submarines. This means that the number of nuclear weapons onboard submarines as a total will decrease, but the strategic position of the Northern Fleet will be far more important in Russian nuclear strategy than it is today. According to Russian military experts, the Russian Navy in the future will need to retain a maximum of 16 strategic nuclear submarines, 21 attack submarines, and 12 tactical submarines.[59] Western experts maintain that even fewer submarines will be required.
If the number of permitted strategic nuclear warheads per submarine is decisive for the number of submarines Russia chooses to maintain in service, the six Project 941 - Typhoon class submarines in combination with seven submarines from the Project 667 BDRM - Delta-IV class should prove sufficient. These 13 nuclear submarines can carry 1 750 nuclear warheads between them; however, it seems unlikely that Russia would choose a defence system based solely upon strategic nuclear submarines. A new Project 971 - Akula class attack submarine is scheduled for delivery in 1996.[60] Furthermore, there are three nuclear submarines of the new Project 885 - Severodvinsk class currently under construction, a type that can be used both as a strategic and attack submarine.[61]
The reduction in the number of nuclear warheads as a result of the START-I and START-II Treaties is shown in the table below. The table also compares the nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, as well as the distribution of nuclear warheads on land and at sea:[62]
| Number of Warheads September 1, 1990 | Number permitted: START-I | Number permitted: START-II | |||
| Missile type | Soviet Union | USA | After 7 years | After 7 years | 2003 |
| Ballistic missiles | 9.416 | 8.210 | 4.900 | Not specified | |
| Intercontinental missiles | 5.958 | 2.000 | 1.540 | 1.200 | |
| Submarine launched missiles | 2.804 | 5.760 | Not specified | 2.160 | 1.700 - 1.750 |
| Total | 18.178 | 15.970 | |||
Table 2: The nuclear balance between the USA and Russia.
The future number of strategic submarines in the Northern Fleet will ultimately depend on the development of the political and economic situation in Russia.[63]
Some of the largest challenges facing the Russian Navy at this time are the problems associated with the decommissioning of ageing submarines and the storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, at the present level of funding it will be impossible to solve any of these problems. At present, plans exist only on paper as to how to execute the work through the years 2005-2010.[64] Yet the task of dismantling the force of ageing submarines must be seen in a much longer perspective. The overhanging danger of accidents and radioactive leakage from laid up nuclear submarines increases from year to year, and both from an environmental and economic perspective, it is important that the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and the securing of storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste is undertaken quickly. Otherwise, as the technical condition of these vessels and installations continues to deteriorate, it will become far more expensive to solve the problems associated with them.[65]
Footnotes[57] Ibid. Return
[58] Office of Naval Intelligence, World-wide Submarine Proliferation in the Coming Decade, 3rd version, May 1995. Return
[59] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22, 1995, interview with commander-in-chief of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Oleg A.Yerofeev. Return
[60] Severny Rabochy, January 19, 1995. Return
[61] Jane's Fighting Ships 1995-96, 98th edition. Return
[62] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 10, 1996. Return
[63] Krasnaya Zvezda, April 15, 1995. Return
[64] Murmansky Vestnik, March 15, 1995. Return
[65] Krasnaya Zvezda, July 13, 1995. Return
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