There are around 1000 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, or RTGs, in Russia, most of which are used as power sources for lighthouses and navigation beacons. All Russian RTGs have long exhausted their designed service periods and are in dire need of dismantlement. The urgency of this task is underscored by three recent incidents with these potentially dangerous radioactivity sources in 2003—one on the shore of the Baltic Sea, in March, and the most recent two, in the Kola Bay, in November.

In 1992, Bellona released a working paper on 132 lighthouses scattered along the shoreline of Northwest Russia, which are all powered by RTGs. One of them, in fact, is located just a few dozen metres from the Norwegian border.¹

Bellona has warned that radioactive incidents involving these RTGs are possible, both because of the decrepit state of these old lighthouses and because the of premeditated theft of radioactive strontium 90, or 90Sr, that is contained in RTGs. Russia’s RTGs that have been used beyond their operational limits have been waiting to be sent to a repository for decades. At best, however, the nuclear installations presenting the most critical case of sitting on the decommissioning waiting list are stored at sites that are neither appropriate for this task nor meet any safety or security standards. At worst, they become prey of “non-ferrous metal hunters,” who crave to make a quick buck on RTGs, disregarding the risk of radioactive contamination to both themselves and other people.

Most Russian RTGs are completely unguarded against potential thieves or intruders, lacking such minimal security measures as fences or even signs warning of radioactive dangers. Nuclear inspectors visit these sites as seldom as once in six months, and some RTGs have not been checked for more than a decade.

But the biggest danger coming from these unprotected RTGs is their availability to terrorists, who can use the radioactive materials contained in them to make so-called "dirty bombs"—bombs that are triggered by standard explosives, but disperse radioactivity. The damage from such an explosion could surpass by many times that from a conventional bomb, with the ground zero area—potentially, dozens of kilometres—remaining radioactively contaminated for years to come.

Radioisotope thermoelectric generators
An RTG—this abbreviation sometimes stands for "radionuclide thermoelectric generator"—is a source of self-contained power for various independent types of equipment with a steady voltage of 7 to 30 volts and the power capacity of a few watts up to 80 watts. RTGs are used in conjunction with various electrotechnical devices that accumulate and transform the electric energy produced by the generators. The most frequent mode of application for RTGs is using them as power sources for navigation beacons and seamarks.²

The core of an RTG is a thermal energy source based on the radionuclide strontium 90—also known as radioisotope heat source 90, or RHS-90. An RHS-90 is a sealed radiation source, in which the fuel composition in the form of ceramic titanate of 90Sr is sealed hermetically and two-fold into a capsule using argon-arc welding. The capsule is protected against any external impact by the thick shell of the RTG, which consists of stainless steel, aluminium and lead. The biological protection shield is configured in such a way that radiation levels do not exceed 200 milliroentgen per hour, or mR/h, on the surface of these devices, and 10 mR/h at a distance of one metre. ³

The 90Sr isotope's radioactive half-life is 29.1 years. At the time of their production, RHS-90 contains from 30 to 180 kilocuries of 90Sr. The level of gamma radiation reaches 400 to 800 roentgen per hour, or R/h, at a distance of 0.5 metres, and 100 to 200 R/h at a distance of one metre from the RHS-90. It takes no less than 900 to 1000 years before RHSs reach a safe radioactivity level. According to the Russian state nuclear watchdog Gosatomnadzor, or GAN, "the existing system of RTG management does not allow for providing adequate security to these installations, so the situation they are in can be classified as 'an emergency manifested in the unattended storage of dangerous radioactivity sources.' This is why these generators need to be evacuated urgently."⁴

According to the website run by the Moscow-based All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics and Automatisation, or VNIITFA—the developers of RTGs—radionuclide power installations with high energy capacity operate on plutonium 238, or 238Pu, as their fuel.⁵ However, using RHSs based on 238Pu—though this design boasts of certain technical lifespan advantages—also demands significant financial input. Thus, in the past 10 to 15 years, VNIITFA has ceased producing such RTGs for Russian consumers for on-the-ground use.

The RTG developers argue that even if an RHS-90 makes it out into the surrounding environment due to an accident or theft from its RTG, the heat source will still remain intact unless forceful means are used to remove it.

According to specialists from the Russian Ministry of Transportation's State Hydrographic Service, or SHS, "the principal radioactive risk only comes from the sources of ionising radiation based on strontium 90 in RHS-90s." As long as the shell of the RTG is intact—which, to put it in simple terms, is nothing but a transportation case for an RHS-90—it is not considered nuclear waste, say the service's experts.

"If taken outside the safety of anti-radiation protection, an RHS-90 will present a serious danger on the local level for people who happen to be in the immediate proximity to it. Radioactive contamination of the environment is impossible. No such case has ever yet taken place. An experimental detonation of a powerful anti-ship explosive device that was attached to a small RTG did destroy it, but the RHS-90, which was contained in it, remained undamaged."⁶a report by the SHS said.

At the same time, while commenting on the known incidents involving RTGs, representatives of GAN and of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, have acknowledged more than once the probability of destruction of an RHS capsule through natural forces (see below, Chapter 3.1).

According the latest information available, some 1,000 RTGs are located on the territory of the Russian Federation. Alexander Agapov, head of the safety and emergency situations department of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom,⁷ puts the figure at 998 installations. Other Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS, countries operate approximately 30 RTGs. In all, the USSR reportedly produced around 1,500 RTGs⁸. The operation period of all types of RTGs is 10 years. Today, all Russia's RTGs—without exception—have reached the end of their engineering life spans and must be disposed of.⁹

RTGs in Russia are owned by the Ministry of Defence, the Transportation Ministry, and the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, known by the Russian acronym of Rosgidromet. The Transportation Ministry has jurisdiction over approximately 380 RTGs—or 386, according to various reports—with the SHS responsible for their monitoring and accounting. The Defence Ministry owns 535 RTGs, including 415 RTGs run by the Main Directorate for Navigation and Oceanology.

The SHS says it is sufficient to conduct regular inspections of the RTGs located along the shipping lanes of the Northern Sea Route—from several times down to one time a year—to maintain the physical condition of the installations, and the radioactivity levels on their surfaces and in surrounding areas, in order to ensure safety and security of their operation, including prevention of possible acts of vandalism and terrorism.¹⁰

1.1 Types of RTGs
The some 380 RTGs that the Transportation Ministry runs along the Northern Sea Route fall into four types: the Beta-M, Efir-MA, Gorn and Gong.

According to official reports by the Russian State Committee for the Protection of the Environment, "the existing system of RTG management is in contradiction with the provisions of the federal laws 'On the Use of Atomic Energy' and 'On the Radiation Safety of the Population,' because no physical security or safety has been ensured to these installations. At the time when these RTGs were placed at their locations, no consideration was made regarding the probability of damaging impact effected on them by natural and anthropogenic factors. Due to the inefficient practice of RTG accounting and control performed by the operators of these installations, certain RTGs may be 'lost' or 'abandoned.'. In effect, the sites where RTGs are located can safely be regarded as temporary storage places for highly radioactive waste.¹¹ Especially alarming are the potentially negative consequences of losing control over RTGs operating under the jurisdiction of the SHS and the Ministry of Defence."¹²

From the 1960s to the 1980s, VNIITFA developed 10 types of RTGs based on heat sources like the RHS-90.

RTGs differ by parameters which variable according to their voltage output, output power capacity, mass, size and other characteristics. Beta-M type RTGs—one of the first designs, which was developed in the late 1960s—have been used most frequently. Today, around 700 RTGs of this type are in operation. However, the joints in the carcasses of Beta-M RTGs are not welded, and, as the past 10 years experience shows, such RTGs can be easily dismantled right where they stand with the help of nothing more than common fitting tools.¹⁴ like crowbars and hammers.

In the last 10 to 15 years, VNIITFA has not developed any new types of RTGs.

2. RTG accounting
Besides designing RTGs, VNIITFA also developed their corresponding design documentation, which was then handed over to the plant that would produce the RTGs. Orders for new RTGs came principally from the Defence Ministry, the Transportation Ministry, the State Committee for Hydrometeorology—the Soviet predecessor of Rosgidromet—and the former Ministry of Geology, now part of the Ministry of Natural Resources.

The process of developing new RTGs also involved producing small numbers of experimental power generators. Mass-scale production of RTGs in the USSR was the responsibility of a plant called Baltiyets, in the city of Narva in the former Soviet republic of Estonia. In the early 1990s, the plant underwent major changes, including a re-specialisation, and stopped producing RTGs. Now called Balti EES, the company confirmed in a reply to an inquiry from Bellona's that it no longer produces RTGs and that it has no information on the precise locations of those RTGs that it did produce or where they were delivered. However, Balti EES' representatives said that the company's experts have since the early 1990s taken part in replacing RTGs with other energy sources at Estonian lighthouses.

Putting RTGs into operation was in the 1960s the responsibility of a now-defunct specialised organisation within the structure of the Ministry of Medium-Level Machine Engineering, or Minsredmash—its purposefully misleading Soviet-era acronym that was transformed into today's Minatom. They were also put into operation by the very organisations that were to operate them.

When contacted by Bellona, VNIITFA said that, at present, it does not have exhaustive information on exactly how many RTGs have been produced in the country or how many organisations own those RTGs that are still in operation, or even what these organisations are.

Considering the current dismal situation with RTG accounting in Russia, several years ago VNIITFA took upon itself the task of collecting information on RTGs that operate both in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union.

The institute's data point to the same sad truth: All 1000 RTGs located in Russia have completed their projected operation terms and urgently need to be delivered to Minatom's specialised sites for dismantlement.

In accordance with agreements signed between VNIITFA and the Transportation Ministry, VNIITFA every year sends its specialists for inspections of RTGs at their operation sits. In 2001 and 2002, such inspections were carried out at 104 RTG locations run by the ministry.

The unsatisfactory condition of Russia's RTGs has also become the focus of attention for GAN, which specifically addressed the problem of RTGs operating in Russia's Far East in its 2003 report.¹⁵

RTGS in the Far East
In the Far East, according to various accounts, around 40 lighthouses powered by RTGs are scattered along the shoreline of the Sakhalin Island, 30 on the Kuril Islands.

The Far Eastern region of Chukotka has, according to official data, 150 RTGs. Many of them have long been neglected, like the ones in the Bay of Shelting and on Cape Yevreinov. They belong to the regional Kolyma Hydrometeorological Service, but were abandoned after the monitoring service practically ceased to exist in the region.¹⁶ Of these RTGs, 58 are of the Beta-M type, 13 of the Efir type, eight of the Gorn structure and six of the Gong.¹⁷

There is a strong chance that some of the Arctic-based generators have been lost over the past years. According to official data, by the late 1990s, at least six RTGs operating in Russia's Arctic region were in near-breakdown condition.¹⁸ The sites were inspected by a commission, which included representatives from GAN, who came to the conclusion that "the safety situation of the RTGs is highly unsatisfactory, they present a tangible danger for the flora, fauna and aquatic life of the seas of the Arctic region. Their dislocation or mislocation can cause part of the native population of the Arctic region to undergo unjustified radioactive contamination."

According to an August 16th 2003 report by GAN's branch of the Far Eastern Interregional Territorial District, the monitoring commission, while inspecting RTGs located on the Arctic shore of the Chukotka Autonomous District, found one RTG in a state of utter dilapidation, on the Cape of Navarin in the Bering region. The level of the so-called exposition dose on the surface of the generator was as high as 15 R/h. The commission also concluded that a release of radioactive substances into the surrounding environment may have taken place.¹⁹

The republic of Sakha-Yakutia has on its territory approximately 75 RTGs. The generators located on the islands in the Laptev Sea, on the East Siberian and Arctic shores of the Anabar, Bulun, Ust-Yana and Nizhnekolymsk regions, are all the responsibility of the Khatanga, Tiksi and Kolyma Hydrographic Bases, as well as the Pevek buoy inspection team. But this responsibility is mostly on paper. The operation of these North Sea Route RTGs meet no radiation standards. In fact, authorities have effectively lost control over 25 of these generators.²¹

The Siberian Territorial District owns more than 100 RTGs, the bulk of which are concentrated on the Taimyr Peninsula. Another 153 RTGs are scattered along the shorelines of the Barents and White Seas, of which 17 are located in the Kandalaksha Gulf.

According to VNIITFA director Nikolai Kuzelyov, "100 percent of RTGs located along the shore of the Baltic Sea undergo yearly inspections. At the same time, we have to admit that no RTG inspections have been conducted by VNIITFA specialists on the Arctic shores of the Chukotka region because no such contracts have been signed."²³

The responsibility to sustain radiation and nuclear safety standards in military units and bases has, since 1995, been on the shoulders of the Defence Ministry.

As a result, GAN—the state-level nuclear monitoring and licensing body—has no authority to oversee RTGs located on the ministry's grounds, while control over the military is supposed be maintained by the military itself. A rich history of radiation-related incidents caused by the army's neglect toward safety standards tells its own tale on its own.

3. RTGs and security issues
"It may have made more sense to bury RTGs in the ground, so that nobody could find them or stumble upon them. But they were mostly installed some 30 years ago, when nobody bothered to think of any threat of terrorism—besides, the RTGs were not made 'vandal-proof,'" said Minatom's Agapov²⁴.

Agapov confirmed earlier reports of radiation exposure incidents in the former USSR republic of Georgia, where "shepherds would warm themselves up in cold weather with the help of RTGs," which are, in essence, nuclear-powered heat generators.

Minatom, through Agapov, also acknowledges the "existence of unattended RTGs." According to Agapov, "the reason for that is that organisations responsible for the operation of RTGs are unwilling to pay for their shutdown and removal," he said. "It's the same problem as with the new states that were formed on the territory of the USSR after its break-up: 'Take away all the bad things, we get to keep all the good things.'"

At the same time, according to VNIITFA director Kuzelyov, "there is no problem of radioactive contamination of the environment surrounding the RTGs."²⁵

But even while saying that, Kuzelyov admitted that indeed, "most RTG locations do not meet the requirements specified in existing regulatory documents, which is well-known to the management of RTG operators.²⁶ There is, in effect, the problem of the RTGs' vulnerability to terrorists, whose aim is to purposefully use the radioactive materials contained in an RTG."²⁷

3.1 Incidents involving RTGs
On November 12th 2003, the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet found a ravaged Beta-M RTG location in the Bay of Oleniya—which is part of the Kola Bay—on the northern shore, across from the entrance to the Yekaterininskaya Harbour and near the naval town of Polyarny. The team was conducting one of its scheduled examinations of navigational equipment when it found the RTG in ruins and all of its components missing, including the depleted uranium protection shield. The radioisotope heat source—a strontium capsule—was found sunk in about three metres of water near the shore.

On November 13th 2003, the same inspection team found a completely dismantled RTG of the same Beta-M type, used to provide electricity to the navigation mark No 437, located on the Island of Yuzhny Goryachinsky in the Kola Bay, across from the now non-existent settlement of Goryachiye Ruchyi, also close to Polyarny. As in the previous case, the RTG was destroyed from top to bottom, and all of its components stolen, including the depleted uranium protection shield. The generator's RHS was found on the ground near the shoreline in the northern part of the island. The incident was classified as a radioactive accident²⁸.

According to a statement released by the administration of the Murmansk region²⁹, "an RHS represents a source of increased radiation danger with radiating capacity of around 1000 R/h on the surface. For humans and animals, being in proximity to the radiating source—closer than 500 metres—is a serious health or life threat. An assumption could be safely made that the people who dismantled these RTGs were exposed to lethal radiation doses. The FSB [Russia's security service that succeeded the KGB] and the police have begun a search for the alleged thieves and the stolen RTG components that may turn up at metal scrap recycling sites."

The exact date when the two RTGs were vandalised has still not been established. Given that the Transportation Ministry only inspects its RTG locations once or two times a year, it is quite likely that the last time any check occurred was no later than the spring of 2003. According to Bellona's information about the incidents, the area where the RTGs had been operating—and where the strontium capsules were found nearby lying unattended—is not a restricted access territory and is open for any passers-by. Consequently, any stranded visitor may have been exposed to lethal radiation doses for significant periods of time.

On November 15th 2003, the command of the Northern Fleet issued an order to form a special task force to clean up the traces of the accident.

Experts from St Petersburg-based Radon—which specialises in containment and burial of radioactive materials—are removing a strontium capsule that was discarded by alleged thieves after they ravaged a lighthouse in Kurgolovo, a settlement in the Leningrad region, in March 2003. The green arrow points to the place where the "hot" capsule melted the ice and went under water.

The last scheduled inspection of the lighthouse—which operated on a Beta-M generator—prior to this discovery, was conducted in June, 2002.³¹ The thieves, attracted by the apparently simple prospect of looting some non-ferrous metals, stole around 500 kilograms of stainless steel, aluminium and lead. As for the radioactive power element, they threw it out into the frozen sea some 200 metres away from the lighthouse. The "hot" strontium capsule melted the ice and went down to the sea floor. But even though the ice covering the spot where the RHS sank was one metre thick ice over, the gamma radiation exposure dose rate directly above the sunken unit reached over 30 R/h³².

The lighthouse fell under the jurisdiction of a border guard unit serving in the area. Because the unit itself lacked the necessary equipment for a salvage operation, the border guards sent a request on March 23d to the nuclear materials containment enterprise Radon—based near St Petersburg in the nuclear city of Sosnovy Bor—to find and remove the radioactive cylinder. Although Radon specialises in disposing of "orphaned" radiation sources, it is not licensed to deal with RTGs and had to receive a GAN authorisation to retrieve the strontium battery under the ice on the Gulf of Finland. On March 28th, the radioactive element was raised to the surface with the help of a simple shovel and a pitchfork, both equipped with extended handles. It was then loaded on a sleigh, which took it several kilometres across the steep and barely passable shoreline toward the main road, where it was finally put into a lead container. The shell of the strontium battery turned out to be undamaged. The RHS stayed at Radon in Sosnovy Bor for three months and was then sent to VNIITFA.

A similar incident had occurred in the Leningrad region in 1999. An identical lighthouse was found completely destroyed, and its radioactive power element discarded at a bus station in the city of Kingisepp, 50 kilometres away from the crime scene. Three people who the police established were the perpetrators died from radiation poisoning. Just as it was four years later, the task of liquidating that radiation accident was commissioned to Radon.³³

The village of Kurgolovo, where the March 2003 accident occurred, is in the Kingisepp region, not far away from the Estonian and Finnish borders. This area is recognised as a wetland of international importance and was in 2000 granted the status of a nature reserve by the governor of the Leningrad region.

As such, it is entitled to protection of rare flora and fauna species, as well as special control over a shoal area of the gulf, which is part of the reserve and a site of spawning for food fish. It is also a habitat for the grey seal and the ringed seal, a site of breeding colonies and is a migratory stopovers for rare waterfowl and shore birds. At the time the reserve was established, the region's administration was also developing "ecological tourism" in the area—a system of special paths and routes for nature lovers.³⁴

However, the two radioactive incidents caused by the negligent loss of dangerous radiating power elements raise significant doubts about the prospect of flourishing tourist business in the area.

In May 2001, three radioisotope power sources were stolen from lighthouses on an island in the White Sea, in the area of the Kandalaksha nature reserve in the Murmansk region. This reserve is one of Russia's known centres of ecological tourism. Two desperados, keen on looting some non-ferrous metals, received severe doses of radiation. The "hot" RTGs were recovered and sent to VNIITFA in June 2001. From there, they were transported to the Urals chemical combine Mayak. The bill for all these works was footed by the government of the Norwegian province of Finnmark under an agreement with the administration of the Murmansk region as part of a bilateral programme, which envisions decommissioning of RTGs at Russian lighthouses and replacing the radioactive devices with solar batteries.

In 1987, an IEU-1 type 2,5-tonne RTG was dumped in the sea while being lifted and towed by an Mi-8 helicopter of the Far Eastern Administration of Civil Aviation to Cape Nizky in the Okha region on the eastern coast of Sakhalin. The order for the transportation was put by the Defence Ministry's military unit No 13148. The pilots explained that the unusually windy weather was rocking the helicopter so violently that they had no other option but to dispatch the load and dump it into the sea to avoid a crash landing.

In August 1997, another IEU-1 type RTG fell from a helicopter into the sea in the Cape of Maria area of the northern part of Sakhalin in the Smirnykh region. The generator sank at a distance of 200 to 400 metres off the coast in 25 to 30 metres of water. According to military officials, the cause of the accident was the disengagement of the lock of the sling load system due to human error.

Even though the entire blame for these accidents was put on the civil aviation teams who transported the RTGs with the use of a lifting sling, it is the Defence Ministry's Pacific Fleet—the owner of the lost RTGs—that should face responsibility. The military had not worked out any contingency plans to prevent possible accidents and had not instructed pilots prior to the special operations.

Both RTGs are still lying on the sea bottom. So far, samples of the sea water in these areas have not shown increased levels of 90sr, but it should be noted that the marine environment is a chemically active medium, and the factor of several atmosphere of water pressure adds to the risk of the RTGs' destruction. RTGs' carcasses have a number of plugs, joints and channels, through which the sea water is bound to eventually burst into the core, washing out the 90Sr radionuclide and causing it to move further up the food chain from the bottom-dwelling microorganisms to algae to fish and finally to human beings. The probability of such a scenario is confirmed both by GAN officials³⁵ and experts from the IAEA³⁶, who say a radiation leak is possible near Cape Nizky and the Cape of Maria.

The engineered life span of an IEU-1 RTG's component parts is ten years. The operational period of an RHS is thirty years. According to GAN estimates, the metal contained in these elements can lose 85 percent of its durability in 80 years—that without taking into account the tumultuous marine environment, for which RTGs were not even tested by their developers.

The Sakhalin branch of GAN and the Russian State Committee for the Protection of the Environment appealed numerous times to the local governor and regional legislators offering an examination of all the RTGs in the area, provided the authorities assist in the inspectors by lifting the generators from the sea bottom. The two groups—both government structures—however, never received any answer.

In 1999, the Regional Duma of the Far Eastern Magadan region applied to the federal government and the State Duma with a request entitled "On the necessity to take urgent measures of removal of radiation danger sources in order to prevent large-scale radionuclide contamination of the Sea of Okhotsk." The Standing Commission for Nature Management and Environmental Issues of the Sakhalin Regional Duma "examined and supported" the appeal on June 1st 1999.³⁷ However, according to a statement made by the head of the Russian Navy headquarters, Viktor Kravchenko, which was cited in the Russian government-run Rossiyskaya Gazeta: "carrying out a full-scale search [for the RTGs lost in the sea] cannot possibly take place until July or August 2004."³⁸

According to VNIITFA, "up until now there have been no cases involving the destruction of the hermetic sealing of an RHS-90, although there have been a number of serious emergency situations involving RTGs."³⁹

Vladimir Svyatets with his wife.

Vyacheslav Voyakin/Vladivostok newspaper

Further field, in 1998, a two-year-old girl, residing in of the village of Vankarem in Chukotka, died of leukaemia, while another two children were hospitalised on suspicion of the same diagnosis. According to the Sakhalin-based newspaper Svobodny Sakhalin, the illnesses were caused by radiation exposure from an "orphaned" RTG, discarded not far from the village. However, the diagnosis and the cause of the illness were never officially confirmed.⁴³

The health situation of Vladimir Svyatets—the lighthouse keeper of the navigation maintenance station Plastun on the Cape of Yakubovsky in the Primorsky region—has likewise not yet been officially confirmed. In March 2000, a damaged RTG from another navigation station—in the Olgino district of the Pacific Fleet's hydrographical service—was left by Svyatets' house, near the lighthouse.

The radiation emitted by the damaged RTG was far beyond the accepted norms. As a result of severe radiation doses, Svyatets allegedly suffers from chronic radiation sickness—a diagnosis he received from civilian doctors. However, the doctors' statements are being disputed by Russia's Pacific naval command and by military doctors of the Pacific Fleet.⁴⁴

4. The threat of terrorism
The US Defence Department-run Cooperative Threat Reduction, or CTR, programme, which was launched in 1991 considers Russian RTGs a threat of proliferation of radioactive materials that could be used in a dirty bomb by potential terrorists. CTR is also known as the Nunn-Lugar programme for its creators, Indiana Senator Richard Lugar and former Georgia Senator Sam Nunn.

Senator Lugar's website states that "the Russian government does not have an accurate accounting as to where all the generators are located." Accordingly, says the the website of Senator Lugar, who is also Chairman of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee "we must find these units, secure them and remove the dangerous materials."⁴⁵

On March 13th 2003, at an IAEA conference entitled "Security of Radioactive Sources" in Vienna, Minatom head Rumyantsev admitted to the problem.

According to Rumyantsev—whose speech was quoted on the IAEA website—among aggravating circumstances are "the increasing threat posed by various terrorist organisations in the world, the disintegration of former Soviet territory that led to the loss of control over these radioactive sources, and in some cases to the loss of radioactive sources as such."

As an example, Rumyantsev cited incidents of "unsanctioned opening of RTGs by residents of Kazakhstan and Georgia in order to obtain non-ferrous metals. For some, the dose that they have been exposed to turned out to be too high." Rumyantsev also concluded that after the break-up of the USSR, the integral system of government control that used to oversee the installation and transportation of radioactive and nuclear materials had to be recreated anew in separate independent states, which caused an unprecedented wave of previously rare criminal offences, including those involving radioactive sources, reports the IAEA website. ⁴⁶

According to the closing statement made by the IAEA, "high-risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated control, including so-called "orphan" sources, raise serious security and safety concerns. Effective national infrastructures for the safe and secure management of vulnerable and dangerous radioactive sources are essential for ensuring the long-term security and control of such sources."⁴⁷

This lighthouse on the Island of Maly Ainov is now operating on solar energy.

Government of the Norwegian province Finnmark.

Meanwhile, since 2000, VNIITFA has decommissioned only about 100 retired RTGs of various types.⁴⁹

According to the current protocol, RTG cores are dismantled in a special laboratory at VNIITFA. The RHS-90 may be used for energy purposes or qualified as a radioactive waste and sent in special caskx for decommissioning at the Mayak.

Minatom's Agapov saw replacing RTGs with safe solar devices as problematic. "At current, replacement of RTGs with solar batteries has been underway for three years, and RTG decommissioning is carried out simultaneously—about 12 RTGs have been decommissioned in this manner. But then a problem emerges—solar panels need to be wiped regularly wiped down so they continue to collect heat energy, and personnel is needed for that."

In 2002, the Russia government launched a programme called "The National Plan of Action for Marine Environment Protection from Anthropogenic Pollution in the Arctic Region of Russia."

Accounting for RTGs was an item of the plan of action. It was, for example, decided to conduct a complete inventory of the RTGs in Yakutia during 2003 and 2003.⁵⁰ Tamara Argunova, Yakutia's Ministry for Environmental Protection made the point that the RTGs were, in fact, redundant as most maritime navigations is accomplished with global positioning systems linked to satellites. She encouraged swift and diligent decommissioning of the RTGs in her area.

Rough estimates for the removal and complete decommissioning of one RTG in Yakutia come to 4m roubles⁵¹ or about $120,000—the price of installing a new RTG. According to VNIITFA, removal and decommissioning of an RTG in the far flung eastern region of Chukotka amounts to 1m roubles, or $30,000.⁵²

RTGs owned by the Russian Northern Fleet have long surpassed their engineered life span and are considered radioactive hazards. Yet it is Norway's Finnmark region that foots the bill for their decommissioning and replacement of at least some of them with solar panels.

Indeed, there are several agreements between Finnmark and the Murmansk Regional government regulating RTG decommissioning. As per agreement ecommissioned RTG's are first sent for storage at Atomflot, the Murmansk region's service centre for nuclear ice-breakers that are owned by the Murmansk Shipping Company. They are then shipped to Mayak were the decommissioning is completed.

So far, five RTGs have been replace with Norwegian solar panels under one of the agreements between Finnmark and the Murmansk Region, signed in 1998, to swap four RTG's with solar panels.

The first was installed in 1998 at Bolshoi Ainov Island nature reserve at a cost of $35,400, or NOK 266,000.⁵³ Under the 1998 agreement, another two RTGs were replaced with solar panels in 1999 and 2000. The last, in 2002, was installed at the Laush Lighthouse on the Rybachy Peninsula.

In further cooperation between Finnmark and Murmank, the two regions agreed to decommission 15 more RTGS—12 in normal working order and the three that were vandalised for scrap earlier this year.

In June, 2002, a $200,000, or NOK1.5m, agreement was signed between the regions to decommission yet another 10 RTGs.

In August, 2002, US Congressional representatives and Bellona gathered and discussed the prospects of solar powered lighthouses in Norway near the Russian border. Prior to this gathering Bellona had raised the concern about the nuclear powered lighthouses in Russia.⁵⁴.

The governors of Finnmark and the Murmansk region, on April 8th 2003, signed two new contracts, one more RTG decommissioning, and the second for testing Russian-made solar panels. By now, 25 RTGs, with a combined activity of 800,000 curies, have been decommissioned in the Murmansk region.

The new 2003 agreement mandates the decommissioning of another 20, one of them a unique project in that it uses six RHS power sources and has an activity of 300,000 curies. This new agreement will cost $600,000, or NOK 4.5m.

That part of the 2003 agreement that will replace RTGs with solar panels will cost NOK 250,000. The Russian panels will be produced in Krasnodar at the Saturn plant, and are cheaper than western analogues.⁵⁵ They cost about $30,000 each. The solar panel will be designed to accumulates energy during daylight hours, and distribute it to batteries and generators when the sun goes down. The Russian panels will be tested on a lighthouse in Murmansk and a lighthouse in Finnmark.

Endnotes:

1. Bellona Working Paper N5:92, Thomas Nilsen,. "Nuclear Powered Lighthouses," Oslo, 1992.
2. Information granted to the author in reply to an official inquiry to VNIITFA.
3. M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 32. (In Russian).
4. Report on the activities of GAN in the field of nuclear and radiation safety in 1998. Moscow, 1999, p. 72. (In Russian) See also M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003. P. 32. (In Russian).
5. www.vniitfa.ru/_Products/RadioNuclIst/RadioNuclIst.htm (In Russian).
6. Y.V. Klyuyev [head of the SHS of the Transportation Ministry. Prodolzhayem razgovor...// Yakutia, Yakutsk, No. 59, April 1st 2000 (In Russian).
7. Agapov's statements are a reply to the author's inquiry about RTG decommissioning at a Minatom conference in St Petersburg, September 1st 2003.
8. M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov,. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 32. (In Russian).
9. Information confirmed in reply to the author's official inquiry to VNIITFA.
10. Y.V. Klyuyev head of the SHS of the Transportation Ministry, Prodolzhayem razgovor...// Yakutia, Yakutsk, No. 59, April 1st 2000 (In Russian).
11. The Russian Ministy of Natural Resources. The State Report of 1999. www.ecocom.ru/Gosdoklad99/Part1-7.htm (In Russian).
12. The Russian Ministy of Natural Resources. The State Report of 1998. www.mnr.gov.ru/BUTT_R/5/2/Gosdoklad98/Part1-7.htm(In Russian).
13. Information partly taken from: A.M.Agapov, G.A. Novikov, Radiologichesky terrorism... www.informatom.ru/rus/safe/vena/Vena.asp (In Russian), and M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St. Petersburg, N1(6) June 200,. p. 32. (In Russian).
14. Information granted to the author in reply to an official inquiry to VNIITFA.
15. A report on the activities of GAN’s branch of the Far Eastern Interregional Territorial District in the field of nuclear and radiation safety regulation at the sites of application of atomic energy, first half of 2003 www.gan.ru/dvmto/otchet_1_2003.htm (In Russian).
16. The Russian Ministy of Natural Resources. The State Report of 1997. web.archive.org/web/20020223084209/http://www.ecocom.ru/arhiv/ecocom/Gosdoklad/Section29.htm(In Russian).
17. M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St. Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 32 (In Russian).
18. Information provided by the environmental NGO Kaira-Club, Chukotka region, www.kaira.seu.ru/kv/kv0902p2.htm (In Russian) See also: Report on the activities of GAN… 1997. Moscow, 1998, p. 72 (In Russian).
19. GAN Statement http://www.gan.ru/info82.htm (In Russian).
20. Information provided by the environmental NGO Kaira-Club, Chukotka region, www.kaira.seu.ru/kv/kv0902p2.htm (In Russian), see also: M.I.Rylov, M.N.Tikhonov. Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...//Atomnaya strategiya, St. Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 32 (In Russian).
21. Government of Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment. The State Report "On the state of the environment and activities in the field of nature preservation in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in 2001," Yakutsk, 2002, www.sterh.sakha.ru/gosdoklas2001/zakl.htm(In Russian).
22. Information on the violations of licencing terms and the violations of laws, federal norms and regulations in the use of atomic energy, information on the actions taken against the violators, third quarter of 2002 web.archive.org/web/20021024163030/http://www.gan.ru/dvmto/nlic-3.2002.htm(In Russian).
23. N.R.Kuzelyov. A review of “Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti...”//Atomnaya strategiya, St. Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 33 (In Russian).
24. Agapov's statements are quoted as a reply to the author's inquiry about RTG decommissioning at a Minatom conference in St Petersburg, September 1, 2003.
25. N.R.Kuzelyov. A review of "Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti..."//Atomnaya strategiya, St Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 33 (In Russian).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. The Murmansk Regional Administration, Press release of 17.11.2003 No. 386 (In Russian). See also: Igor Kudrik, Rashid Alimov, Charles Digges. Two strontium powered lighthouses vandalised on the Kola Peninsula. http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/31767.html
29. Ibid.
30. Cape of Pihlisaar: 59°47'N 28°10'E.
31. Boris Karpov. Po tolstomu l'du. //Nevskoe Vremya, St. Petersburg, March 22, 2003, nevskoevremya.spb.ru/cgi-bin/pl/nv.pl?art=142016251 (In Russian).
32. GAN Statement www.gan.ru/4upr_spravka_2_2003.htm(In Russian).
33. The author's interview with head of Radon Alexander Ignatov, April 2003; press release of the NGO Zelyony Mir, www.greenworld.org.ru(In Russian).
34. Decree issued by the governor of the Leningrad region No. 309-pg of June 20th 2000, www.lenobl.ru/main2.php3?section=government4_32#Pril3 (In Russian).
35. GAN Statement www.gan.ru/dvmto/stat2.htm (In Russian).
36. Inventory of accidents and losses at sea involving radioactive material. IAEA-TECDOC-1242, IAEA, Vienna. 2001.
37. Marina Plechikova. Gotovitsya expeditsiya...// Svobodny Sakhalin, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, April 30th 2003 (In Russian).
38. Mikhail Gorbunov. Mstitel okhotskogo morya...// Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 30th 2003. See also eco-pravda.km.ru/sreda/rg30il3.htm (In Russian).
39. Information granted to the author in reply to an official inquiry to VNIITFA.
40. V.V.Dovgusha, M.N.Tikhonov, Radiatsionnaya obstanovka na Severo-Zapade Rossii. St Petersburg, 2000 (In Russian).
41. Radiatsiya v tsentre Dushanbe. //"Azia Plus", Dushanbe, April 2002 ecoasia.ecolink.ru/data/2002.HTM/000147.HTM (In Russian).
42. Information granted to the author in reply to an official inquiry to VNIITFA.
43. Marina Plechikova. Sakhalin i Kurily mogut...//Svobodny Sakhalin, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, No. 51(781), December 19th 2002 (In Russian).
44. See, for example, Anna Seleznyova. Radiatsionnaya lovushka...// Ekologiya i Pravo, No. 7, June 2003, P. 18 ( www.ecopravo.info); also see: Yevgeni Izyurov. Khronika luchevoi bolezni. //Vladivostok, N1330, 26th March 2003 ( www.vladnews.ru/magazin.php?id=11&idnews=9509&current_magazin=1330). (In Russian).
45. web.archive.org/web/20030423022347/http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.htm
46. Report by Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev at the IAEA conference "Security of Radioactive Sources," Vienna, Austria. March 11th 2003, www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/RadSources/statement_rus.pdf
47. IAEA conference "Security of Radioactive Sources," Vienna, Austria. March 11th 2003. Findings of the Chair, www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/RadSources/PDF/findings.pdf
48. Agapov's statements are quoted as made in reply to the author's question about RTG decommissioning at a Minatom conference in St Petersburg, September 1st 2003.
49. Information granted to the author in reply to an official inquiry to VNIITFA.
50. Government of Sakha Republic (Yakutia), the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment. The State Report "On the state of the environment and activities in the field of nature preservation in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in 2001," Yakutsk, 2002, www.sterh.sakha.ru/gosdoklas2001/zakl.htm(In Russian).
51. Yakutia. 38 iz 75 radioizotopnykh generatorov podlezhat utilizatsii. Regnum News Agency, January 20th 2003 12:04 (In Russian).
52. N.R.Kuzelyov. A review of "Problemy radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti..."//Atomnaya strategiya, St. Petersburg, N1(6) June 2003, p. 33 (In Russian).
53. The Murmansk Regional Administration. Statement on the international cooperation of November 22d 2000, www.murman.ru/ecology/comitet/report99/part7_5.html(In Russian).
54. Thomas Nilsen. Nuclear Lighthouses to be Replaced. www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/28067.html, Oslo, Febrary 2d 2003.
55. Pyotr Bolychev. Bolshe kron...// Murmansky Vestnik. Murmansk. April 12th 2003 (In Russian).