Alexander Nikitin: ‘Our our main goal was liquidating nuclear waste dumps in Northern Russia’

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A woman holds a sign reading “Ecology is no the sphere of the KGB; Ecology is not a state secret; Ecology is life on earth” at a 1997 protest for Nikitin’s freedom outside FSB headquarters in St. Petersburg.
bellona archive
ST. PETERSBURG – Fifteen years ago, in March of 1994, a report was published which, in essence, saved the Arctic region from a nuclear catastrophe. The report by the then little-known Bellona Foundation uncovered the secrets that were for decades hidden by Soviet authorities, and later, the Russian military. Bellona, 18/03-2009 - Translated by Charles Digges The subject of the secret was some 150 decommissioned nuclear submarines languishing at dockside at the ports of the Russian Northern Fleet with their spent nuclear fuel still on board. These cast-off submarines were rusting and their terrifying cargo of spent nuclear fuel could well have ended up in the waters of the Barents and White Seas at any moment.  The successor of the USSR – the Democratic Russia – had no money to devote to their dismantlement.

Retired naval captain first rank Alexander Niktin came to Bellona in 1994. As a specialist in nuclear and radiation safety, he took the most active role in preparing Bellona’s second report “The Northern Fleet.” Its publication shocked the world – everyone knew that the Russian military had it bad, but to such a degree as shown in the report was jaw dropping. Having revealed the secrets of the temple, Nikitin bore the brunt of the state penal meat grinder.

Despite Nikitin’s fight in a weight class above his own, he still emerged victorious. Nikitin shares his memories of that duel 15 years ago that propelled him onto the world environmental stage with noted Russian human rights writer Nina Katerli.

Nina Katerli: How did your work with Bellona begin?
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Alexander Nikitin in his naval uniform.
bellona archive

Alexander Nikitin: At the beginning of 1994, I still hadn’t heard of Bellona, and knew still less about neighbouring Norway. For me, as a former submariner, Norway was part of NATO. It was associated with such Norwegian-NATO things as the anti-submarine borders of Nordcap, Medvezhy, with Orion spy planes, Mariata intelligence vessels and so on.

But on March 1st 1994 the first “Black” report (so called because of the colour of its cover) came out and found its way into my hands as well. This was a real event for Norway. The citizens of this northern country had sketchy information about the Russian (nuclear test) polygon of Novaya Zemlya, about dozens of military bases on the coast, about hundreds of nuclear vessels. But they didn’t know what degree these were a threat to their heath and environment. After all, to that moment, the USSR had hidden all of its secrets behind the Iron Curtain. And all of a sudden, here is information about nuclear contamination along the very border. All of Norway could do nothing but talk about this. The sea and fishing is the main sustenance of Norway. Radioactive waste not only in the ocean environment, but even on shore, was taken by Norway as a threat to its personal safety.

In March of 1994 I met two Norwegian journalist activists from Bellona who had come to Russia to investigate the situation. I understood they had a pretty meager understanding of the actual threat.  And they were lucky – for the post Perestroika Russian media, nuclear and radiation pollution was no longer a secret. But, on the other hand, I understood that the concerned citizens of our neighbouring country hadn’t had the opportunity to study the problem more deeply.

Marked as a spy
AN: I had already taken an active role in the writing of the second report “The Northern Fleet.” This caused enormous scandal in the Motherland.

NK: And you expected a different reaction?

AN: Of course, I wasn’t expecting champagne and roses. But I was counting at least on understanding. After all, our main goal was liquidating nuclear waste dumps in Northern Russia. Over a few years the first portion of nuclear filth would begin to appear and lead to a real environmental catastrophe. Answers to the problem needed to be found, if not by our own strength, then by attracting the resources of other countries. However, in Russia, over a 15-year-period, no one, especially the nuclear industry and the military and the secret services, believed that western governments could supply financial, technical and other kinds of help.

Therefore, instead of solving these problems, a hounding of anyone who dared discuss them began. More specifically, this was the reaction not of Russia’s executive and legislative authorities, but of its secret services, and the military and nuclear lobby. (The Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom, at that time was heading by Yevgeny Adamov, who has since been disgraced by a guilty verdict that he had bilked millions in government funding for nuclear clean up projects.)

NK: And it was then that you were accused of being a spy…

AN: A few military personnel and bureaucrats from (Russia’s state nuclear corporation) Rosatom are still convinced that I work for some intelligence service or for  (Osama) Bin Laden. Sometimes I am not even allowed to attend public events…
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A rusted out Northern Fleet nuclear submarine.
bellona archive

Unfortunately, at that time there was no understanding that to liquidate the breeding grounds of danger, information was the most important thing to have. Our reports were the first information about the nuclear and radiological threat. You have to bear in mind here that the radioactive threat is not visible, not audible, and has no colour or scent. You don’t sense it, but as a result you die, you children die, your grandchildren die. But it’s a much simpler to find an enemy by calling him a spy than it is to solve a problem.

Under investigation
NK: Did it occur to you that such work could land you behind bars?
   
AN: When a person isn’t breaking the law, but to the contrary is trying to do a good deed, he can’t even imagine that jail is a threat.

NK: When did you first sense you were in danger?

AN: In October of 1995, they came in the evening to my home. They searched my apartment all night, and took me off for interrogation.  It wasn’t very pleasant, but my naiveté helped out. I was sure: this must be some kind of mistake and in five minutes everything would be back to where it should be. But instead of five minutes, I had to wait almost five years.

Strict and constant surveillance began. At first, I took it as a game of cat and mouse – they would chase and I would run. And I was occasionally able to shake the tails. But after they roughed up the lawyers that were covering me from the pursuers, slashed my tires a couple of times, glue my car doors, beat our dog in our apartment while we were out, I started to feel nervous.

NK: Alexander, you had to visit the Big House (the headquarters of the Federal Security Service, or FSB, in St. Petersburg) several times. How was your first visit?

AN: They brought me there about 11 pm and let me go a four in the morning. That’s their hobby – night interrogations. But even then I didn’t have a sense of any real danger. I had the feeling that I was taking part in someone else’s life, not my own. There’s the KGB, there’s a half-lit room with (chief FSB investigator) Maksimenkov, there’s a table lamp, government-issue furniture, behind the window blinds an open bottle of vodka, and questions about nothing. ‘Tell us about yourself, about your friends, acquaintances, where they went, what they said, who did you pass information to, where the money that we found in your apartment from…Ah, you sold your apartment in Moscow? And how did they pay you, in dollars or roubles?’ – laws against having foreign currency were still on the books.

Finally, they let me go. They even offered me money for a taxi. When I refused, they were happy – the vodka had run out.

The arrest
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Nikitin being led from a courtroom in 1996.
Sergei Grachev/The St. Petersburg Times

AN: Four months passed between my fist visit to the fifth entry way to the Big House and my arrest. I went to see Investigator Maksimenkov like I was going to work. They came by in the morning saying Maksimenkov really missed me and that I had to go see him immediately. Of course, the telephones in my apartment were turned off for some reason. So we went in a grey government car, me in the back seat between two people. We arrived, had another chat, but now in the presence of one more person who they said was a lawyer. Then a fourth person came, who they called prosecutor Gutsan, and he brought an arrest warrant.

Today, Gutsan is a great man, first deputy to Russia’s Prosecutor General (Yury Chaika). I am even proud of my acquaintance with him. Consider that his promotion was my favour to him. 

As concerns my feelings – I didn’t have any emotions. There was just emptiness and fatigue because what lay ahead was unknown. Moreover, at the beginning there was a leapfrogging of lawyers. Every day they tried to palm off one of their own vetted guys. Each one promised something. One said he would pull some strings to get me to a good labour camp, the second advised me to tell everything and get what I deserved, the third promised something else. Then I stopped listening to them. They didn’t get any interrogations without a lawyer, and time passed…

NK: And then Yury Schmidt appeared…

AN: Yury came himself and said that he would get to be my lawyer without filling out forms to get security clearance. And he did. He went to the Constitutional Court and sorted it out there. True, I only know these details today. But then, sitting in a cell for three months without a lawyer with the threat of facing the firing squad – at that time, the death penalty has not yet been abolished – I had second thoughts about everything.

Schmidt returned with the permission documents from the Constitutional Court with a whole team of lawyers – Viktor Drozdov, Ivan Pavov, Mikhail Matinov, Jon Gaslaa and the famed Genry Reznik. Reznik was called upon by the judges of the Supreme Court, through which my thorny path to victory also passed. 

Thirteen court proceedings
NK: Did you feel any support from the outside?

AN: Constantly. Newspapers, the radio, and later, television reported on news of press conferences, protests, pickets, the arrival of Members of European Parliament in St. Petersburg and so on. Bellona played an enormous role in sounding the call for public opinion.

NK: Did you know what was happening on the streets on the day of your first court proceeding?
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An activist holds a sign reading “We demand an open court for Nikitin.”
bellona archive

AN: Of course, the court on the Fontanka (embankment in St. Petersburg), a mass of people with placards, people from Bellona, reporters, acquaintances, lawyers. There was a sensation that it was a holiday of some kind, but in fact a court hearing, the outcome of which was unpredictable.

However, court ended quickly – Judge Golets sent the case back for further investigation. After that, I was let out of custody – which was fantastic and unbelievable. Nobody but Schmidt thought that was possible. So, I awaited the final verdict free – this was the magnificent achievement of Yury.

The FSB tried to suck some accusation out of its finger. But Shmidt’s team worked like a machine. Then, after about a year, there was another hearing – the City Court of St. Petersburg. After that, the Supreme Court and the Presidium of the Supreme Court. We had to drink the cup down to the bottom. In all, in five years there were 13 court proceedings, beginning with the regional courts and ending in the Presidium of the Supreme Court.

NK: This is a story that you and I recounted in our book “The Nikitin Case: Strategy for Victory.”

AN: Of course. And although there was no shortage of kind words about Yury Schmidt, I want to underscore that Yury is a great lawyer. Do you recall his brilliant summation at the concluding hearing? It was art that is honed over the course of a lifetime. And there comes a time that it must be put to use. Such was the case.

NK: That’s true. But your own preparation cannot go unaccounted for. I remember that you answered every question instantly and convincingly, citing facts and documents such that it became clear to all that during the preparation of the report no classified information was used, which was the central point of the accusation against you. The information was there in open sources, even in aged textbooks.

And then there was Andreyeva Bay…
NK: You were acquitted, but the struggle is not over. Has it ever occurred to you that you can leave it behind? 

AN: During those years, despite the difficulties, I was an optimist. Now I have become a pessimist. I don’t see a real way out of the political dead end that the country has been chased into over the past eight years. Occasionally I want to shut my eyes to not see what is happening. But mobile telephones, the Internet and television will always chase you down.

In the daring 1990s, whatever you say, there was hope. Now, there is no hope. But nevertheless, I still have unfinished work called Andreyeva Bay. We started it many years ago and we have to finish it. On the site of this nuclear graveyard the grass must green.
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Reporters descend on Nikitin after a St. Petersburg court finds him innocent in 2000.
bellona archive

NK: What results of Bellona’s work do you consider to be the most important?

AN: Bellona has written a series of reports on nuclear topics. And today it continues to work in this direction. Our goal is to completely rid Northern Russia of nuclear and radiological threats. And when we do that, our mission will be considered accomplished. There is not a long way to go: Andreyeva Bay with its 34 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel.

When we finish this project (according to some evaluations, this will require another 10 to 15 years), I will complete my work with Bellona and find less turbulent matters. For now, we must continue to work, using our accrued experience and knowledge. To save other people from new ‘remarkable’ initiatives of the current authorities, like the law on state secrets…

NK: Do you think you would have been able to win your case had it occurred today?

AN: I don’t think so, because it is impossible to win cases like Khodorkovsky’s, Syutagin’s, Danilov’s and hundreds of others. My case took place during a politically advantageous time when the administration of the president didn’t interfere with judicial authority. Court then were more independent. Today’s KGB cronies were not in power, and they couldn’t lobby the cause of their institutions. The court was regulated exclusively by rights and laws.

NK: What can be done to overcome Russia’s growing case of spy mania?

AN: The political system that is based on the secret services must be replaced.

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