US efforts In Georgia to contain nuclear theft being routed by Russian army

Part of: Theft of radioactive materials in Russia , Theft of radioactive materials in the ex-Soviet republics , Bilateral Programmes
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The flag of the Georgian military. US nonproliferation officials say that the ongoing conflict is endangering important US bilateral programmes geared toward containing nuclear smuggling.
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Continuing fighting between Russian and Georgian forces over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have plunged two crucial US-led anti-nuclear theft programmes into chaos, say officials with the US Department of Energy, which leads the nonproliferation and anti-nuclear smuggling efforts. Charles Digges, 20/08-2008

One high-priority programme that was assisting the former Soviet Republic to identify possible smugglers of nuclear bomb components across its porous borders has been halted by the military struggle that erupted two weeks ago. US programme advisors have, according to DOE officials, been forced to flee the region.

Another DOE effort that has been upended by the local violence is the tracking of abandoned radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs) – thousands of highly radioactive strontium and caesium powered batteries that were placed throughout remote portions of the Soviet Union as navigational beacons and power sources.

These sources have fallen into decrepitude, and much of the paperwork on their whereabouts and conditions were lost with the Soviet Union’s fall. The RTG units are frequently dismantled for valuable scrap metal by scavengers. More troubling, the strontium and caesium sources also go missing.

The DOE-led effort to isolate, dismantle and dispose of these forgotten facilities “will, for the time being have to be shelved,” said a DOE source in a telephone interview.

“The ensuing poverty and migration that will come of this conflict will lead to scavenging of these radioactive batteries for scrap metal and in some cases the fuel itself – they pose both a danger to civilians and a proliferation danger, because who knows now who can get at them,” said the source, who asked his name not be used as he is not allowed to speak publicly on the issue.

“All we can do is sit on out hands,” he added.

Georgia last hope against nuclear traffic
Georgia carries the brunt of law enforcement activities geared against possible traffickers in nuclear materials and is considered by the US government to be a hotbed of nuclear smuggling. The majority of nuclear parcels that are stopped by Georgian interior ministry officials are brought through the lawless break-away republic of South Ossetia, whose capital, Tskhinvali, was attacked by Georgian forces on August 6th, thus precipitating the current clash.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) a semi-autonomous division of the DOE, which oversees the department’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union, reported that in 2006 Georgian authorities detected and seized small amounts of plutonium and cesium-137 during two separate smuggling attempts, according to the Stanford University Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources, one of the world’s most comprehensive nuclear smuggling tracking projects.

Over the past decade other radioactive materials, including plutonium, have also been intercepted on the black market, said Georgian officials in statements that were confirmed by the Stanford Database.

"NNSA regards work in Georgia as a priority due to its location with respect to potential nuclear smuggling routes," said NNSA spokeswoman Casey Ruberg. "We look forward to continuing this work as soon as advisable."

Are Georgia’s borders secure?
Last week during meetings that were scheduled before conflict exploded in Georgia, American and European nuclear terrorism experts focused their discussions on the worsening situation in Georgia.

“We have raised questions about this conflict and about the broader issues that it raises,” former Ambassador and Counselor of the United States Department of State under the Clinton Administration, Wendy Sherman, said. Sherman is now a member of the US Congress’s Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a foreign policy advisor to Presidential candidate Barack Obama.

“The commission in taking a look at what else we might be doing,” she said from Vienna, where the congressional body was meeting, adding that the central question is: “Are (Georgia’s) borders secure?”

Georgia says they are not

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Georgian snipers take aim at South Ossetian insurgents in a conflict that shows now signs of cooling after more than two weeks of heated fighting.
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Georgian interior ministry officials maintain that much of the nuclear material they stop can be traced directly to Russian sites, largely in Siberia. But, complained on official in an interview with Bellona Web Tuesday, the Russians are satisfied to leave these clean up efforts to Georgia, and will rarely take responsibility for Russia nuclear material ending up in the hands of Georgian law enforcement.

“To say that we are intercepting materials that come from Russia, and have the Russian’s admit it, means that the Russian sites are not as secure as they want the world to believe,” said the Georgian interior ministry spokesman, who, citing the current violence requested anonymity.

A spokesman for Russian Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov – who has recently rattled Russia’s nuclear chains at Poland over a prospective US missile shield – dismissed the Georgian claims as “fairytales directed to provoke anti Russian sentiment in the west.”

“We observe total security over sites Georgia claims are insecure – to suggest that we do not is ludicrous,” the spokesman said from Moscow by telephone.

Already flagging US border security efforts drop to a standstill
NNSA assistance – in conjunction with the US Department of State and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative has focused on training Georgian officials to stem smuggling and building a secure radioactive materials depository.

Prior to the Russia invasion – which despite a week old cease-fire shows no sign of abating – the NNSA was also helping Georgia install contemporary radiation detection equipment at 20 sites in Georgia, including 14 border crossings, two seaports, three airports, and a training center. To date, only six border crossings, two seaports, and the training center are considered secure, the NNSA said Tuesday.

Is nonproliferation cash well spent?
Many in the United States, which funds such nonproliferation efforts as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, the DOE’s efforts to train former weapons scientists and shut down plutonium production reactors in Russia and the former republics, have questioned the billions that have been spent on such programmes when there is still the possibility of massive security breaches.

Many in US Congress argue that Russia, now flush with oil revenues, should take the efforts on itself, especially in light of the damaged relations between the two countries.

"It is hard to see how cooperation between our two countries on any matter, including the cooperative threat reduction, can be sustained," Leonard Spector, deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, told the Boston Globe.

Others, however, say that it is more imperative than ever that these bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation efforts continue.

"They ought not look at all [US-Russia] relationships and terminate them," former secretary of defense William Cohen told the paper.

Sherman agreed in her interview.

“We have to deal with the immediate situation, but it remains in (Russia’s) national security interest and ours to have threat reduction [programmes] - when it comes to nuclear material or nuclear weapons, this is very serious business."
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